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Executive Summary 
The declining share of beef in total U.S. meat consumption has motivated indus-
try-wide efforts to improve average beef quality through more effective coordination 
among the various market participants. Increased use of explicit “grid” pricing mecha-
nisms over the last decade represents initial efforts at improved coordination. More recent 
efforts include animal-specific carcass data collection, with subsequent transmission to 
feeders and the relevant cow-calf operations, and improved “source verification” proce-
dures aimed at (among other things) reducing the overall cost of medical treatment for 
live animals. None of these organizational innovations is costless; indeed, a number of 
significant barriers must be overcome before such practices can be adopted more widely. 
In this paper, we take a detailed look at one organization’s attempts to overcome some of 
these barriers and provide an assessment of the costs and benefits of doing so.  
 
Keywords:  cattle markets, information transmission, source verification. 
 
  
 
 
Quality Management and Information Transmission  
in Cattle Markets: A Case Study of the  
Chariton Valley Beef Alliance 
Introduction 
Beef consumption has declined steadily over the last two decades, both in aggre-
gate quantity and as a share of total U.S. meat consumption. Reductions in the price of 
pork and poultry relative to beef and health concerns regarding the consumption of red 
meat account for a large portion of this trend. However, relative improvements in the 
quality and consistency of pork and poultry products are also cited as important con-
tributing factors (Purcell 2000; Schroeder, Marsh, and Mintert 2000). Perhaps not 
coincidentally, beef has lagged behind pork and poultry in adopting mechanisms for 
vertical coordination among the various production stages from farm to market; con-
tract arrangements and direct vertical linkages are common in pork and poultry 
production, while beef production is still predominantly coordinated through “market” 
mechanisms (Hayenga et al. 2000).  
Whether vertical coordination of the kind observed in pork and poultry markets is 
necessary for further improvement in beef quality is a question that beef industry partici-
pants are currently trying to sort out. A variety of novel marketing practices has been 
adopted in recent years in an apparent attempt to improve quality and reduce overall 
production costs. At one extreme, there have been (very recent) attempts to fully integrate 
the beef production process, with a single firm coordinating genetic selection, feeding 
practices, slaughter and fabrication, and marketing. Long-term marketing arrangements 
between feedlots and packers represent a somewhat less extreme form of integration and 
have been used in some production areas for many years. Interestingly, the most widely 
adopted change in recent years—so-called grid pricing—represents an attempt to improve 
market coordination through more sophisticated quality-based pricing mechanisms. In 
this case, there are essentially no formal vertical linkages, though there is an attempt to 
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improve vertical coordination by sending more precise signals concerning the relative 
value of alternative carcass attributes.  
Behind all these efforts is at least one common objective: to align incentives among 
the various specialized segments involved in beef production so that quality improvement 
is in everyone’s self-interest. As we explain in more detail in the next section, many of 
the traditional mechanisms for marketing live cattle (both feeder and finished cattle) 
clearly are not designed with this objective in mind. In particular, there are significant 
restrictions on the flow of production-relevant information across the various stages of 
beef production. For example, feedlot operators typically are not provided detailed 
information on the genetic characteristics and health status of animals arriving at their 
feedlots, even when efficient feeding strategies may be contingent on each of these pieces 
of information. Similarly, ranchers normally receive, at most, lot-average information on 
the carcass characteristics of cattle they produce, making it impossible to evaluate the 
performance of individual breeder cows for improved genetic selection. Of course, 
removing these sorts of restrictions is not costless. Information has to be collected and 
transmitted and, perhaps most importantly, incentive structures (i.e., marketing arrange-
ments) must be developed that provide the relevant parties with appropriate incentives for 
making these changes. Organizational change of this nature will only occur if the associ-
ated benefits are sufficiently large relative to the costs.  
To get some feel for the potential magnitude of these benefits and costs, we take a 
detailed look at one organization’s attempt to overcome restrictions on information flows 
among cow-calf operations, feedlots, and packers. This particular organization—Chariton 
Valley Beef Alliance (CVBA)—operates as a sort of market intermediary by facilitating 
coordination within existing market mechanisms and thus achieves a degree of vertical 
coordination without formal vertical linkages. This is in contrast to other types of coordi-
nating institutions, for example, fully integrated organizations, and other forms of formal 
vertical linkages.  
We begin with a brief overview of cattle production and marketing and provide more 
detail on the informational barriers that exist in these markets. We then analyze the 
activities of the CVBA in the context of these markets. In the subsequent two sections, 
we analyze the relative merits of organizations like the CVBA, which operate largely 
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within the structure of existing cattle markets, and we investigate other forms of vertical 
coordination that may involve significant consolidation of asset ownership and deci-
sion-making authority among cattle market participants. 
 
Cattle Markets and Information Transmission 
Our intent in this section is not to provide a comprehensive description of cattle mar-
kets but rather to focus on a particular set of issues having to do with the transmission of 
production-relevant information across the various stages of production. In particular, we 
examine existing barriers to the flow of production-relevant information from cow-calf 
operators (or “ranchers”) to feeders, and from packers to feeders and ranchers.  
The production process for beef cattle is typically characterized in terms of a number 
of discrete stages starting with genetic selection and breeding, then rearing and weaning, 
and finally fattening to market weight (“finishing”) and slaughter.1 Specialization in 
cattle markets to some extent mirrors each of these stages: seed stock firms control 
genetic selection and breed development; ranchers manage cow-calf herds and raise 
young calves through the weaning stage; feeders raise animals from weaning to market 
weight; and packers slaughter and process live animals. Although there are many varia-
tions on this specialization structure,2 for the moment, we’ll focus on this particular 
arrangement.  
Ignoring also the need to coordinate these various specialized units, one can in prin-
ciple characterize efficient decision making at each production stage, subject to a given 
set of growing conditions, breed type, feed costs, and other market parameters, and 
subject to many other pieces of production-relevant information. For instance, a feeder’s 
nutrition and health maintenance program for a given animal (or lot of animals) might 
conceivably depend on nutrition and treatment histories during the rearing and weaning 
production stages, thus creating the need for information transmission from ranchers to 
feeders. Evidence of latent demand for this kind of information comes from two sources. 
First, in a recent survey of feedlot managers, respondents indicated that they typically 
receive little information about incoming feeder cattle vaccination schedules, implant or 
nutritional histories, and even less about genetics and feedlot and carcass performance 
(Behrends, Field, and Conway 2001). This is the case even though the vast majority of 
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respondents also indicated a willingness to pay a premium for cattle with accurate 
information on these criteria.  
Second, Yeboah and Lawrence (2002) analyzed source verified (SV) and pooled 
feeder cattle auctions held in Bloomfield, Iowa, each October, November, and December 
from 1997 through 2000. This study compared price data from these SV auctions with 
data from traditional auctions at the same location to determine whether a premium exists 
for SV feeder cattle. Hedonic pricing models were estimated to evaluate the price effects 
of lot characteristics, market forces, and type of market (SV vs. regular sale). The SV 
cattle were sorted and pooled into large lots. Consistent with early research, the larger lot 
size earned large price premiums. Measured at the mean lot sizes across all weights as 
classes, the SV cattle received $2.33/hundredweight (cwt) more than the regular sale 
cattle. After accounting for lot size, the SV premium for lighter cattle (<650/600 lb 
steers/heifers) was estimated at $1.30/cwt and was significant. The SV premium over and 
above lot size was not significant for heavier feeder cattle.  
Alternatively, ranchers might want information on feeders’ management procedures, 
finishing performance (e.g., average daily gain, feed efficiency, health status), and 
post-slaughter carcass quality in order to evaluate past decision making. For example, 
Hall, Parrish, and Busy (1993) found that multiyear participants in steer test programs 
that received carcass data were able to achieve a greater degree of uniformity as evi-
denced by smaller standard deviations for hot carcass weight; average daily gain; fat 
thickness; percentage of kidney, pelvic and heart fat; ribeye area; yield grade; and retail 
product per day on feed.  
Transmission of production-relevant information about traits is important for 
real-time decision making in feedlots, while information about management procedures 
and production outcomes is important for future decisions and for efficient adaptation by 
ranchers. While information transmission of these sorts might seem like an obvious 
requirement for efficient decision making in beef production systems, in fact it rarely 
occurs. Tracking, recording, and transmitting information is costly; precisely how costly 
depends in large part on how coordination is achieved. Imagine, for example, that each 
production segment is represented by a single firm and that these firms are fully “inte-
grated” in that they do business only with each other. Information transmission in such a 
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setting would be relatively straightforward, so long as the parties can control various 
kinds of strategic behavior that might arise. For example, depending on how prices are 
determined for feeder calves, ranchers may want to falsely report information about their 
calves that would increase their value in the eyes of the feeder. Unless all relevant 
information about the calves can be obtained from visual inspection (in which case 
information transmission occurs trivially), some procedure is needed for verifying 
information reports. In the relatively simple organizational structure contemplated here, 
where the parties are engaged in a repeated relationship, it is perhaps natural to suppose 
that these kinds of strategic problems can be overcome with dynamic incentives and 
without incurring the cost of third-party information verification. This might be the case 
when a farmer feeder (as opposed to a commercial feeder) obtains cattle from a relatively 
small number of ranching operations with whom long-standing relationships exist.  
Now imagine a slightly more complicated organizational arrangement with a single 
feeder firm, a single packing and slaughter firm, and a large, anonymous group of ranchers 
who supply weaned calves to the feeder. Because the ranchers are anonymous, the parties 
can no longer rely on dynamic incentives, and must rely instead on some form of costly 
third-party verification. Things can be further complicated by supposing that there are two 
or more feeders who compete for the supply of feeder calves at any given point in time. 
Then, in addition to third-party information verification, some mechanism (e.g., auction) is 
needed to allocate available calf supplies efficiently. Although it is not immediately 
apparent how the need for such a mechanism further complicates information transmission, 
it is important to recognize that once established, the proprietors of that mechanism may 
have an economic interest in restricting information transmission. Such is apparently the 
case for some livestock auctions. As we describe in more detail below, there is anecdotal 
evidence that traditional auction barns fear detailed information transmission and commu-
nication between feeders and ranchers (i.e., the removal of anonymity), because this can 
lead the transacting parties to conduct their business outside the auction. Finally, we can 
add one more layer of complication: in actual markets between ranchers and feeders, it is 
typically the case that only some ranchers and feeders wish to engage in more intensive 
information transmission. If the cost of setting up a separate market for these feeder cattle 
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is excessively high, then the existing market must simultaneously handle both types of 
animals. As we’ll see below, this induces significant transaction costs.  
If the previously described costs are sufficiently high, the transacting parties may 
choose to either forgo information transmission entirely or may seek some substitute 
information that is perhaps not quite as detailed but less costly to obtain. In the context of 
markets for feeder calves, so-called order buyers possibly fill this role. These are special-
ized individuals (and sometimes firms) whose expertise lies in evaluating feeder calves 
through visual inspection. Many feedlots either employ (or “contract”) order buyers to 
supply calves with traits that are appropriate given the expected environmental condi-
tions, end product markets, and management practices of the particular feeding 
operation.3 However, any such visual inspection, no matter how experienced the buyer, is 
an imperfect substitute for perfect transmission of all production relevant information.  
A similar set of arguments and discussion can be applied to information transmis-
sion in the reverse direction from packers to feeders and ranchers. As noted above, 
information about carcass traits is important to firms upstream from packers in order to 
assess the impact of decisions on performance, and to update decision-making rules. 
Traditionally, cattle markets have functioned without explicit transmission of carcass 
attributes to upstream producers.4 Recently, however, grid pricing—where the price 
paid for a given animal depends on various measured quality attributes, in addition to 
the total weight of the animal—has become increasingly common. Relative to tradi-
tional spot markets where price is based on live or carcass weight with no explicit 
adjustment for quality, significantly more information is reported back to ranchers and 
feeders. However, the information that is reported back is generally not animal specific, 
and even if it is, it often is reported only to feeders (and not to ranchers). We will 
explain why this is, but for now we just note that in most grid pricing mechanisms, 
packers report the distribution of carcass quality for a given lot of animals,5 rather than 
the carcass quality of each individual animal. Thus, for example, a feeder might learn 
that 60 percent of a given lot graded “Choice,” 40 percent graded “Select,” 70 percent 
graded “Yield Grade 2,” and 30 percent graded “Yield Grade 3” but not know which of 
the animals within the lot graded in each category. This is important because manage-
ment decisions often vary across different animals that are priced in the same lot,6 and 
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feeders may want to know the carcass traits of individual animals in order to assess the 
efficacy of their management decisions.  
In the next section, we describe the activities of one organization that is attempting to 
overcome these kinds of informational barriers in an effort to improve farm-level deci-
sion making. We then provide a rough analysis of the benefits and costs associated with 
the organization’s activities and discuss alternative organizational structures that are 
meant to achieve a similar level of informational transparency and coordination between 
the various stages of production. Our intent is to use the activities of this organization as 
a case study of organizational innovation in agricultural markets. We also hope to shed 
some light on the important organization-theoretic question of why markets generally 
seem to be poor mechanisms for transmitting non-price information across individual 
producing agents.  
 
The Chariton Valley Beef Alliance 
The CVBA, which represents about 350 cattle producers in southern Iowa and north-
ern Missouri, has been in place since early 1998. Initial motivation for the alliance arose 
from an increasing use of grid pricing arrangements by area packers and resulting pro-
ducer interest in learning to effectively produce, sort, and market cattle under these 
arrangements. There was also general interest among area producers in “adding value” to 
their cattle by improving quality and identifying higher-paying markets. In this section, 
we provide a brief overview of the organizational structure, administration, and funding 
of CVBA and then describe the set of activities in which the organization is currently 
engaged. The organization’s primary activities directly address the two informational 
barriers discussed in the previous section.  
Organizational Structure and Membership 
The CVBA legally is structured as a 501C non-profit organization. It is governed by a 
seventeen member elected board of directors representing twelve counties and five at-large 
seats. The organization was initially founded by local area cattle producers, with technical 
assistance from several partners, including Lucas County Extension, Iowa State University 
Extension, Iowa Cattleman’s Association, Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, Practical Farmers 
of Iowa, AG Connect, and Iowa Beef Center. Initial funding for the organization was based 
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on a three-year grant from the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture, with additional 
support provided by the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, and various other small grant 
programs. The organization also receives funds from annual membership dues ($25 plus 
$.25 per head marketed, not to exceed $100), and charges various service fees (described in 
what follows) on a cost-recovery basis. There is no commitment of any kind associated 
with membership, and anyone can become a member at any time. In addition to outside 
grant support, the organization benefits from significant in-kind support (office, computer, 
and phone) from local county Extension. Annual operating costs for the organization 
(roughly $30,000) are comprised mostly of salary for one part-time and one full-time 
employee. The average beef cowherd size in Iowa is 37.5 head. The 12 counties in South 
Central Iowa where CVBA originated have over 20 percent of Iowa’s beef cowherd, and 
the average herd size is slightly larger than the state average—over 42 head. CVBA 
members are described as larger and more progressive than typical producers with most 
ranging in size from 80 to 350 beef cows. The 100 or so active users of CVBA services 
treat their herds as a commercial enterprise, and many of these producers also feed their 
own calves and may buy other cattle to feed in their small feedlots. The members’ rela-
tively small cowherds and feedlots allow them to utilize carcass data and market 
information services to improve management and marketing options. However, their small 
size also makes it difficult to justify the cost of providing these services by themselves.  
Services  
The CVBA provides three kinds of services to member producers: grid marketing 
support and coordination of load deliveries, carcass data collection, and source verifica-
tion. We discuss each service in turn.  
Grid Marketing Support and Load Coordination. Grid pricing greatly increases the 
incentive to sort cattle into relatively uniform lots that will perform well on particular 
grids. A typical grid offers a base price for “Choice Yield Grade 3,” and then offers 
premiums and discounts for quality outcomes above and below this base. However, the 
specific premiums and discounts offered can vary substantially across different grids. 
Table 1 contains actual premiums and discounts offered on a subset of quality and yield 
grades for three different grids (labeled A, B, and C) during the week of November 27, 
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TABLE 1. Selected southern Iowa grid comparisons 
  Quality Grade 
Grid 
Yield 
Grade Prime Choice+ Choice Select Standard Comm. 
A  1 8.75  6.75  3.75  −2.25  −35.00  0.00  
 2 8.25  6.25  3.25  −2.75 −35.00  0.00  
 3 5.00  3.00  0.00  −6.00  −35.00  0.00  
 4 −10.00  −12.00  (15.00 (21.00 (50.00  (15.00  
 5 (15.00 (17.00  (20.00 (6.00 (55.00  (20.00  
B  1 13.00 8.50  5.00 (2.00 (20.00  (20.00  
 2 11.00 6.50  3.00 (2.50 (20.00  (20.00  
 3 8.00 3.50  0.00 (3.00 (20.00  (20.00  
 4 (12.00 (16.50  (20.00 (23.00 (40.00  (40.00  
 5 (17.00 (21.50  (25.00 (3.00 (45.00  (45.00  
C  1 11.00 8.50  5.00 (3.00 (20.00  (35.00  
 2 9.00 6.50  3.00 (3.00 (20.00  (35.00  
 3 6.00 3.50  0.00 (3.00 (20.00  (35.00  
 4 (14.00 (16.50  (20.00 (23.00 (40.00  (55.00  
 5 (19.00 (21.50  (25.00 (3.00 (45.00  (60.00  
Source: Personal communication with Diana Bodensteiner, Chariton Valley 
Beef Alliance.  
 
2001. Direct observation of the numbers in these grids (and ignoring other quality premi-
ums and discounts not reported here) reveals the potential opportunities for growers (and 
packers, assuming that specified premiums and discounts reflect market opportunities) to 
gain from efficient sorting. For example, animals expected to receive a “Commercial” 
quality grade receive the highest payment across all yield grades under grid A. For all 
other animals, grid B dominates both grids A and C. Of course, it is impossible to know 
the exact distribution of quality within a given lot at the time a feeder markets his or her 
cattle. Relative, to traditional spot markets, where buyers paid a fixed price for live 
animals, feeders thus bear substantial quality risk. However, this risk also entails a 
benefit, which is the added incentive feeders have to produce high-quality animals and to 
carefully sort for a given distribution of quality. To the extent that growers and feeders 
are able to influence the quality of their cattle, and “match” heterogeneous cattle with the 
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appropriate grid, these incentives can yield substantial benefits.  
The CVBA assists growers in acquiring the skills to accomplish these tasks. This is 
primarily accomplished with analysis of growers’ carcass data, which we discuss in the 
next subsection. CVBA also provides weekly grid-market reports that include publicly 
available price information, and base price information collected from each packer 
individually. The base price information requires a bit of explanation. Briefly, grids 
commonly used in Iowa are “formula” grids that pay growers a base price which is a 
function of the Nebraska weighted average price of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and the distribution of quality for each individual plant where a grid is offered. 
The specific functional relationship is composed of the USDA weighted average price 
report, plus a packer-specific adjustment (or “cleanup”) to ensure that the average price 
paid for cattle in any given week is equivalent to the Nebraska weighted average price. 
Thus, the cleanup is calculated as the average premium (discount, if negative) across all 
animals delivered in a given week, and this amount is subtracted from the Nebraska 
weighted average price to yield the actual base price. The purpose of this adjustment is 
presumably to ensure that each packer pays roughly the same average cost for cattle (as is 
the case in the market).  
Finally, given the size of most cattle operations in southern Iowa, it is often the case 
that a producer will have a number of cattle ready for sale on a given grid but insufficient 
quantity to fill an entire truck. In such cases, CVBA also provides support for growers to 
coordinate in jointly filling a truckload for delivery to a particular packer. This service 
can result in substantial transportation efficiencies for long-distance hauls, allowing 
growers to access grids at more distant packers.  
Carcass Data Collection. As mentioned in the previous section, grid marketing in-
volves the pricing of individual animals (rather than lots of animals) based on the 
measurement of various carcass-quality attributes, yet animal-specific carcass measure-
ments are rarely transmitted back to the feeders and producers who deliver under these 
arrangements. One important—perhaps the most important—activity of CVBA is to 
facilitate and coordinate this transmission. Producers interested in obtaining carcass data 
pay a service fee to CVBA ($3–$8 per head), who then coordinates with a third party to 
physically carry out carcass measurement during slaughter; these measurements are then 
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recorded in electronic form for access by the relevant producer. Packers cooperate in this 
process by allowing third-party access to the slaughter floor to measure economically 
important carcass traits (beyond those reported in USDA yield and quality grades). 
CVBA additionally provides computational and analytic support for accessing and 
interpreting the relevant data. While it might seem a trivial matter to distribute animal-
specific carcass quality data to producers (given that prices are determined with this 
data), in fact it is quite a complicated and costly endeavor. As we noted, doing so adds 
anywhere between $3 and $8 dollars per head to the cost of production; Iowa State 
University Extension estimates a gross margin of roughly $15 per head for Iowa ranchers, 
so these amounts are quite large.7 In any case, producers are primary users of animal-
specific carcass data but are one step removed from packers. 8 This further complicates 
collection of the data, because feeders must cooperate in obtaining the relevant data 
(except in instances when producers retain ownership of their cattle).  
Source Verification. Assessing quality in markets for feeder cattle is a notoriously 
difficult task. As we’ve discussed, USDA quality grades do exist for feeder cattle, but 
they are rarely used; instead, quality assessment largely is carried out through visual 
inspection by experienced buyers. Many of the important “quality” characteristics of 
feeder calves, of course, are not fully expressed until the calves have been fattened and 
readied for slaughter. In practice, this difficulty is overcome to a certain extent through 
the nature of contracting arrangements between ranchers and feedlots. In some cases, 
revenue from finished cattle sales are shared between the two parties, and in other cases, 
ranchers retain ownership of their cattle through the finishing stage. Nevertheless, the 
bulk of cattle are “sold” by ranchers to feedlots through traditional market mechanisms 
(e.g., auctions and spot negotiations), and quality assessment at the point of sale is a 
highly subjective process.  
One means of making this process more objective is to provide third-party verifica-
tion of genetic and health characteristics of feeder cattle. While the ultimate “quality” of 
the finished animal is impossible to assess at the point of sale between rancher and 
feeder, it is possible to evaluate quality potential through this type of information. More-
over, if we define quality broadly to include potential cost efficiencies from acquisition of 
production-relevant information as described earlier, then such information can be of 
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further value. Anecdotal evidence suggests that significant amounts of “excess” treatment 
occur in feedlots as a prophylactic response to uncertainty about animal health status. 
CVBA assists in arranging for this kind of third-party verification through its SV (source 
verification) program. In addition to providing an objective measure of quality, SV 
provides feedlots with accurate information on the status of medical treatments that have 
occurred before the point of sale and on the genetic composition of animals in a given lot. 
Finally, CVBA’s SV program includes agreements by those receiving information on 
feeder cattle to return information on carcass quality. Information thus flows in both 
directions.  
Interestingly, CVBA attempts to operate within existing market institutions to facili-
tate further vertical coordination of this sort. However, perhaps for this very reason, the 
organization has had limited success so far in establishing a self-sustaining SV program. 
Existing market mechanisms are extremely well adapted to aggregating supplies and 
coordinating their efficient allocation to prospective buyers. However, they are less able 
to handle idiosyncratic and specialized transactions. For example, SV cattle are only of 
value to buyers if they are purchased in lot sizes that are sufficiently large to be treated 
separately from other (non-SV) cattle. If a buyer must form a lot with both SV and 
non-SV cattle, he or she will likely treat the entire lot as though it were non-SV to avoid 
the additional cost of maintaining separate management information for each animal. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the proprietors of existing markets have a stake in 
maintaining the status quo. As a result, any move toward further vertical coordination 
between buyers and sellers is viewed with great suspicion, and efforts to facilitate the 
logistical needs of these parties are limited.  
This example highlights the principal shortcoming of market mechanisms: informa-
tion transmission across firm boundaries is not costless. At present, it appears the benefits 
of markets (efficient aggregation and price discovery) outweigh any costs associated with 
this shortcoming.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we identify a number of seemingly obvious shortcomings in the way 
cattle production is organized and discuss one organizational response to these shortcom-
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ings. Traditional cattle markets, while extremely efficient means of allocating cattle 
supplies across buyers, lack mechanisms for animal-specific information transmission. 
Given the segmentation observed in cattle production, information transmission is 
important for efficient decision making at each of the various production stages (rearing 
and weaning, feeding, slaughter and packing). The lack of full communication and 
information transmission represents a coordination failure (as opposed to a technical 
failure). All parties involved apparently understand the potential gains from greater 
communication and information transmission but lack appropriate incentives. In some 
cases, various kinds of transaction costs must be incurred to bring about change. Given 
that actual change is slow to occur in these markets, either these transaction costs are 
large relative to the benefits from improved coordination, or the uneven distribution of 
benefits across industry participants limits incentives for one or more of the parties to 
participate.  
If an alliance of producers such as the one considered here is unable to achieve 
greater coordination within existing market institutions, some form of direct vertical 
integration will likely emerge instead. The recent (failed) initiative by the organizers of 
Future Beef to form a ranch-to-market production organization represents one example of 
movement in this direction.  
  
Endnotes 
1. Often the finishing stage is preceded by a “backgrounding” stage that serves as 
preparation for finishing.  
2. An individual producer might simultaneously ranch, feed, and develop seedstock; 
some packers own feedlots that supply their plants; and so on.  
3. Interestingly, there are also USDA established grades for feeder cattle, though they 
are rarely used explicitly in actual pricing mechanisms between ranchers and feeders. 
Twelve distinct grades classify calves into various combinations of “frame size” 
(skeletal structure in relation to age) and “thickness” (development of the muscular 
system in relation to the skeletal system) (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2000). Im-
portantly, these grade attributes all pertain to physical characteristics of animals—
there is no assessment of health status, prior feeding regimes, or any other “unob-
served” attributes that may be important to feedlot operators.  
4. Some information is implicitly transmitted when buyers visually inspect animals for 
purchase and arrive at a bid price. Indeed, Schroeder, Marsh, and Mintert (2000) note 
how packing plants often provided buyers with grid sheets indicating price premiums 
and discounts to award (or penalize) various expected (based on the buyer’s visual 
inspection) quality outcomes. Nevertheless, the information conveyed through a 
buyer’s bid aggregates information about individual carcass attributes that may be 
valuable in disaggregate form.  
5. A “lot” of cattle in a typical feeding operation represents roughly 150-200 head.  
6. This is an unavoidable consequence of uncertainty that is inherent in the biological 
production process for cattle. Animals mature at uneven rates so that a feeder may 
need to pool cattle across heterogeneous feeding and health maintance regimes when 
preparing a lot for delivery to the packer.  
7. The diffculty in obtaining the data lies in the nature of the cattle slaughter and pack-
ing process. When an animal enters the plant and is slaughtered, it is immediately 
hung on a rail tracking system and assigned a plant identification. However, “rail 
outs” of some animals disrupt the matching of plant identifications with grower iden-
tifications at the point of grading. The task of the third party is to manually track 
animals through to the grading point using the growers’ identifications, and to physi-
cally measure economically important carcass traits.  
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8. Other users of this data include breeders interested in the performance of progeny, 
pharmacuetical companies, university researchers, and others who want to measure 
carcass performance for research purposes.
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